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Abstract. Today, offline attacks are one of the most severe threats to
password security. These attacks have claimed millions of passwords from
prominent websites including Yahoo, LinkedIn, Twitter, Sony, Adobe
and many more. Therefore, as a preventive measure, it is necessary to
gauge the offline guessing resistance of a password database and to help
users choose secure passwords. The rule-based mechanisms that rely on
minimum password length and different character classes are too naive
to capture the intricate human behavior whereas those based on proba-
bilistic models require the knowledge of an entire password distribution
which is not always easy to learn.
In this paper, we propose a space partition attack model which uses
information from previous leaks, surveys, attacks and other sources to
divide the password search space into non-overlapping partitions and
learn partition densities. We prove that the expected success of a par-
tition attacker is maximum if the resulting partitions are explored in
decreasing order of density. We show that the proposed attack model
is more general and various popular attack techniques including proba-
bilistic attacker, dictionary-based attacker, grammar-based attacker and
brute-force attacker are just different instances of a partition attacker.
Later, we introduce bin attacker, another instance of a partition attacker,
and measure the guessing resistance of real-world password databases.
We demonstrate that the utilized search space is very small and as a
result even a weak attacker can cause sufficient damage to the system.
We prove that partition attacks can be countered only if the partition
densities are uniform. We use this result and propose a system that
thwarts partition attacker by distributing users across different parti-
tions. Finally, we demonstrate how some of the well-known password
schemes can be adapted to help users in choosing passwords from the sys-
tem assigned partitions and investigate their effectiveness by performing
a usability study.
Keywords: text-based password, password security, offline attack model, coun-
termeasure, search space partitions
1 Introduction
Text-based passwords were introduced in the digital world in the mid-1960s to
provide controlled access to time-sharing computers [10]. Today, with the prolif-
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eration of internet services such as banking, insurance, utility, media and many
others, the role of text-based passwords has been renewed to protect access to
the diverse range of resources residing on the remote web server. However, the
use of human-generated text passwords as an authentication mechanism raises
some serious concerns which need to be addressed. Text-based passwords are
drawn from a relatively small space which makes them vulnerable to guessing
attacks [36,29,53]. This vulnerability is due to the user’s preference for common
dictionary words and the predominant use of lowercase letters and digits. To
achieve the desired level of security, various alternatives such as graphical pass-
words and biometrics have been proposed. However, the benefits provided by
text passwords are unmatched and cannot be achieved by any of the existing
alternatives [16]. Consequently, text-based passwords still remain the dominant
form of user authentication.
Depending upon whether the guessing is carried out remotely or locally,
guessing attacks can be categorized into two types, online attack and offline
attack. In an online attack, the attacker attempts to login into the system by
guessing the password of a legitimate user. To improve the likelihood of a suc-
cessful login, the online attacker sorts the password guesses in decreasing order of
probability (learned from previous breaches) and tests popular passwords first.
These attacks work well on websites with a large user base. For instance, the
breach of around 32 million accounts from the Rockyou website revealed that
the password “123456” was used by 290,731 (∼1%) of its users [25]. Further, re-
cently published password frequency list of 70 million Yahoo users [11] reveals
the count of the most popular password to be 753,217 (∼1%). This real-world
data suggests that the online attacker can compromise nearly 1% of the accounts
by merely trying a single guess on the target website. The conventional lock-out
strategy that limits the number of unsuccessful attempts does not counter such
attacks which target many accounts with a handful of popular passwords.
To mitigate the threat of online attacks, Schechter et al. [43] proposed the
use of a count-min sketch data-structure to count the occurrences of every pass-
word on a given system and to prohibit those passwords that reach a certain
popularity threshold. Later, South et al. [50] proposed counting the occurrences
of passwords as well as their variations that lie within hamming distance of two,
especially targeting the leet transformations that replace letters ‘a’ with ‘@’, ‘i’
with ‘!’ and so on. Websites such as Twitter took a more direct approach by
banning 370 popular passwords. Thus, blacklisting the use of popular passwords
and their common variants can provide much better resistance to online attacks.
The offline guessing attacks, on the other hand, pose a very serious threat
to password security. In this scenario, the attacker has complete access to the
database comprising passwords of all registered users of a website1. The attacker
in possession of the password database can generate and verify potentially un-
limited guesses against hashed passwords. And, if passwords are simple, such as
1 We assume that these passwords are protected using a one-way hash function, oth-
erwise no guessing is required.
dictionary words or small enough for brute-force search [36], then the attacker
can recover them in no time.
Nowadays, the breach of a password database is a common event. In the past
few years, millions of passwords have been stolen from prominent websites includ-
ing Yahoo, LinkedIn, Hotmail, Twitter, Sony, Adobe and many others [6]. The
continuous improvement in the state-of-the-art password crackers has resulted in
a conglomeration of different attack techniques2 ranging from simple dictionary
attacks [29] to more sophisticated attacks based upon the Markov model [37]
and probabilistic context-free grammar [53]. Moreover, with the advent of GPU
computing, there has been a tremendous rise in the guessing capability of the
offline attacker. For instance, in 2012, a 25-GPU cluster [1] was unveiled which
could generate 350 billion NTLM hashes per second and therefore guess a stan-
dard eight character length Windows password (958 search space) in less than
six hours. Further, the password guessing tools have already been optimized to
work on GPU [4]. Thus, the frequent occurrences of high magnitude breaches
along with the availability of sophisticated cracking techniques combined with the
high speed GPU clusters has made offline password guessing a real threat, which
needs to be addressed.
Various attempts have been made in the past to measure the strength of a
password database against offline attacks. The popular technique to infer the
resistance of a password database is by simulating attacks on publicly available
breached databases [53,28,34] or on passwords collected from surveys [48,30,47].
NIST provides an entropy measure for gauging password strength [38], however,
this approach is not based upon large empirical data and depends only upon the
password length and character classes (such as lowercase, uppercase, digit and
symbol) used for composing passwords. In 2012, Bonneau [15] proposed a partial
guessing metric to measure the resistance of a password database against offline
attacks. The attack model used in deriving this metric assumes the knowledge of
a password distribution which is not easy to learn. This attack model accurately
represents the all-powerful attacker who has complete information to enumerate
all passwords in decreasing order of probability. However, there are circumstances
where the attacker cannot be assumed to have this complete information.
The offline attacker mainly exploits the fact that few passwords and their
variations are very popular (these popular passwords are mostly learned from
the breached databases such as Rockyou). However, a major fraction of the pass-
word database consists of infrequent passwords [52] and their probabilities are
not easy to learn. For instance, the most popular Rockyou password occurred
290,731 times, however, a long list (53%) of Rockyou passwords occurred less
than five times. Further, if a website implements new password policy that black-
lists previously breached passwords and prohibits passwords exceeding certain
frequency threshold (as proposed by Schechter et al. [43]) then the attacker can-
not estimate the probabilities of passwords in the target database until such type
of passwords gets leaked.
2 While demonstrating the effectiveness of these attacks, researchers assumed that the
target password database is protected using a one-way hash function with no salts.
In this paper, we propose a more general attack model which utilizes infor-
mation from previous leaks, surveys, attacks and other sources to divide the
entire password search space into non-overlapping partitions. Although the at-
tacker cannot learn the password probabilities, we show that the attacker can
still learn the partition level features and recover many passwords. The size of
the resulting partitions depends upon the information possessed by the attacker.
The more information regarding the target password the more granular are the
partitions. We provide the intuition behind this partitioning attack model using
an example. Suppose that the offline attacker acquires an unprotected password
database comprising φ = 26 passwords drawn from a small hypothetical search
space σ. Further, suppose that after analysing these 26 plaintext passwords, the
attacker divides the entire password search space into 16 non-overlapping chunks
as shown in Figure 1.
Fig. 1. Division of a hypothetical search space σ into 16 partitions.
Definition 1. The division of a password search space σ into n non-overlapping
chunks {σ1, σ2, . . . , σn} is known as partitioning and the chunks themselves are
called as partitions.
As shown in Figure 1 all 26 passwords are distributed in just 6 partitions and the
remaining 10 partitions are empty. Although the search space depicted in the
figure is for illustration purpose, we shall see later in section 4 that the situation
of the real world passwords is very much similar. The fact that most partitions
of the search space are never used clearly shows the gap between the available
search space and the utilized search space. After learning the partitions using
φ = 26 passwords, the attacker can now break the protected passwords in the
target database by simply ignoring the 10 unused partitions and utilizing the
available computing resources to explore these 6 utilized partitions. Thus, the
search space for the attacker is reduced considerably. However, we show that the
attacker can do better than this.
For convenience, we view the password search space shown in Figure 1 as a
2-D array of 4X4 partitions and refer to its 16 partitions by a tuple (x, y), where
x indicates the row and y indicates the column number of the partition. Now,
consider the partitions (1, 1) and (1, 3) that have 4 and 8 passwords respectively.
Thus, for creating passwords, the partition (1, 3) seems to be more popular
than the partition (1, 1). We capture the notion of popularity by defining the
probability of a partition. Let φi represent the number of passwords in a database
that belong to ith partition. Therefore we have,
φ =
n∑
i=1
φi (1)
Definition 2. The probability pσi of a partition σi is the fraction of passwords
in a password database that belong to the partition σi.
pσi = φi/φ (2)
The probability of the partition (1, 1) is 4/26 while the probability of the parti-
tion (1, 3) is 8/26. Thus, the partition (1, 3) is more popular than the partition
(1, 1). Earlier, we saw that the attacker can benefit considerably by ignoring
the partitions that are never used. But now, instead of exploring the utilized
partitions in any random order, it seems that the attacker can improve guessing
efficiency by exploring the partitions in decreasing order of probability. However,
we observe a serious flaw in exploring the partitions in probability order. To see
this, let |σi| denote the size of the ith partition. Thus,
|σ| =
n∑
i=1
|σi| (3)
In Figure 1, the size of the partitions in the row number 4 is greater than the
size of the partitions in every other row. Thus, if the utilized partitions are
explored in decreasing order of probability, the attacker can first explore either
the partition (1, 3) or the partition (4, 2) as both contain the same number of
passwords. However, the attack is more efficient if the partition (1, 3) is explored
first, since its size is smaller than the size of the partition (4, 2) and hence requires
less computation. We capture this notion by defining the density of a partition.
Definition 3. The density dσi of a partition σi is defined as the ratio of the
number of passwords in a password database that belong to the partition σi and
the size of the partition σi.
dσi = φi/|σi| (4)
Since φ1,3 = φ4,2 and |σ1,3| < |σ4,2|, the density of the partition (1, 3) is greater
than the density of the partition (4, 2) i.e 8/|σ1,3| > 8/|σ4,2| and therefore, the
partition (1, 3) should be explored first.
Thus, in the proposed attack model, the attacker divides the password search
space into partitions and learns partition level features. The size of the resulting
partitions depends upon the information available to the attacker. The attacker
can now spend its resources more wisely by targeting just the utilized partitions.
In this paper, we provide an optimal search strategy for a partition attacker. We
demonstrate the effectiveness of a partition attacker and also show how these
attacks can be countered. Specifically, our contributions are as follows.
1.1 Contribution
1. We propose an offline attack model in which the attacker uses information
available from previous breaches, attacks and surveys to learn partitions and
to estimate partition level features such as partition densities and probabili-
ties. The granularity of the resulting partitions depends upon the information
available to the attacker. More information regarding the password database
results in more refined partitions. We refer to this attack model as space par-
tition attack model and the attacker as partition attacker. We prove that the
success rate of a partition attacker is maximum if the resulting partitions
are explored greedily in decreasing order of density.
2. We show that the proposed attack model is more general as the existing
well-known attack techniques including brute-force attacks, dictionary at-
tacks [29], grammar-based attacks [53], probabilistic attacks [15] and attacks
on random password generators [22] can be explained using our partition at-
tacker framework.
3. We demonstrate the effectiveness of the partition attack model with another
instance of a partition attacker which we refer to as bin attacker. We mea-
sure the resistance of the publicly available breached databases and show
that with the current computing power bin attacker can break nearly 90%
passwords in all password databases. Further, we hypothesize that the pres-
ence of composition policies still leads to non-uniform bin densities and hence
can be exploited by bin attacker.
4. We prove that partition attackers can be countered only if the partition
densities are uniform. We use this result and propose a bin explorer system
to resists offline attacks by distributing users across different bins uniformly.
5. We propose various bin assignment strategies for achieving uniform bin den-
sities. We also derive password policy parameters such as password length
based upon the computing capability of the partition attacker and the num-
ber of users in the system.
6. Finally, we adapt some of the well-known schemes to help users in choosing
passwords from the system assigned bins and investigate their usability.
2 Space Partition Attack Model
In the space partition attack model, the partition attacker uses information
from previous leaks, surveys and attacks to divide the search space into par-
titions and to learn the partition level features such as partition densities and
partition probabilities. The sizes of the resulting partitions need not be identical
and can vary anywhere between 1 and the size of the search space σ. The gran-
ularity of partitions depends upon the information possessed by the attacker.
The more information the attacker possesses, the more granular the partitions
are. Now, these resulting partitions can be explored in various ways, the attacker
can simply ignore the empty partitions and explore the non-empty partitions ei-
ther in random order or in decreasing order of partition probabilities. However,
we prove that the expected success of a partition attacker is maximum if the
resulting partitions are explored in decreasing order of density.
Suppose that the attacker possesses the repository of passwords collected
from various sources. Assume that these passwords are drawn from the password
search space σ and the attacker divides the search space σ into n partitions
{σ1, σ2, ..., σn}. Thus,
σ = ∪ni=1σi (5)
Further, suppose this is the best refinement of the search space σ which the at-
tacker can achieve. We emphasize that the attacker has no further information
regarding passwords inside the partitions. If the attacker had more information
then these partitions could be refined further, thus contradicting the best re-
finement assumption. Therefore, the attacker assumes every password within a
given partition to be equally likely.
Let φ n denote the total number of passwords in the password repository
of attacker and φi denote the number of passwords that belong to the partition
σi. Since the same password can be used by multiple users, φi represents the
cardinality of a multiset, where each element of this multiset is a password
drawn from the partition σi.
φ =
n∑
i=1
φi (6)
Thus, the partition densities are dσ = { φ1|σ1| ,
φ2
|σ2| , . . . ,
φn
|σn|} and the partition
probabilities are pσ = {φ1φ , φ2φ , . . . , φnφ }.
Now, let α < |σ| represent the number of guesses that the attacker can
compute to mount the offline attack. Since α < |σ| the attacker cannot mount
the brute-force attack on the search space σ. The objective of the attacker is
to maximize the success rate of the attack using the limited computational re-
source α. Assume that the attacker distributes this resource α across n partitions
{σ1, σ2, ..., σn} as {α1, α2, ..., αn}, i.e. the attacker spends an effort of αi ≤ |σi|
on the partition σi. Thus,
α =
n∑
i=1
αi (7)
Since the attacker has only the partition level view and assumes every password
within a given partition to be equally likely, the attacker can expect to recover
αi · φi|σi| passwords from the partition σi after generating αi guesses. Therefore,
the expected success of a partition attacker is,
E(success) =
n∑
i=1
αi · φi|σi| (8)
2.1 Partition Attacker Characteristics
In short, the partition attacker can perform the following tasks:
1. divide the password search space σ into n partitions {σ1, σ2, ..., σn}.
2. compute partition level features such as partition densities
dσ = { φ1|σ1| ,
φ2
|σ2| , . . . ,
φn
|σn|} and partition probabilities pσ = {
φ1
φ ,
φ2
φ , . . . ,
φn
φ }.
3. assume every password within a given partition σi to be equally likely with
a probability φi|σi| .
4. decide upon a specific attack strategy and distribute the available computing
power α < |σ| among n partitions {σ1, σ2, ..., σn} as {α1, α2, ..., αn} .
5. explore the partition σi by generating αi random guesses without repetition.
In the next section, we show how this partition attacker can spend the avail-
able resource α pragmatically and achieve the maximum expected success.
2.2 Maximum Expected Success
Theorem 1 Suppose that the partition densities are non-uniform. Further, with-
out loss of generality assume that φ1|σ1| ≥
φ2
|σ2| ≥ . . . ≥
φn
|σn| . If the computational
resource α available for an attack is limited, i.e. α < |σ|, then the maximum
expected success of a partition attacker is,
Emax(success) =
i0∑
i=1
φi + (α−
i0∑
i=1
|σi|) · φi0+1|σi0+1|
(9)
where i0 is such that
i0∑
i=1
|σi| ≤ α <
i0+1∑
i=1
|σi|.
Proof. Let ,
αi =

|σi| 1 ≤ i ≤ i0
α−
i0∑
i=1
|σi| i = i0 + 1
0 i0 + 2 ≤ i ≤ n
(10)
Then, by equation (8) the expected success for the attacker is,
E(success) =
i0∑
i=1
φi + (α−
i0∑
i=1
|σi|) · φi0+1|σi0+1|
(11)
Now, we show that the attacker cannot do better than this. Suppose that the
same effort α is distributed across n partitions of the search space σ in other
way, i.e. α =
n∑
i=1
α
′
i. Then, by equation (8) we have,
E
′
(success) =
n∑
i=1
α
′
i ·
φi
|σi| (12)
Now we have,
∆ = E(success)− E′(success) (13)
∆ =
n∑
i=1
(αi − α′i) ·
φi
|σi| (14)
∆ =
i0∑
i=1
(αi − α′i) ·
φi
|σi| + (αi0+1 − α
′
i0+1) ·
φi0+1
|σi0+1|
−
n∑
i=i0+2
(α
′
i − αi) ·
φi
|σi|
(15)
Using equation (10), we get (αi−α′i) = (|σi| −α
′
i) ≥ 0, for i ≤ i0. Also we know
that φi|σi| ≥
φi0+1
|σi0+1| , for i ≤ i0.
i0∑
i=1
(αi − α′i) ·
φi
|σi| ≥
i0∑
i=1
(αi − α′i) ·
φi0+1
|σi0+1|
(16)
Again using equation (10), we have (α
′
i − αi) = α
′
i ≥ 0 for i ≥ i0 + 2, and we
know that
φi0+1
|σi0+1| ≥
φi
|σi| for i ≥ i0+2.
n∑
i=i0+2
(α
′
i − αi) ·
φi0+1
|σi0+1|
≥
n∑
i=i0+2
(α
′
i − αi) ·
φi
|σi| (17)
Using equations (15), (16) and (17), we get,
∆ ≥
i0∑
i=1
(αi − α′i) ·
φi0+1
|σi0+1|
+ (αi0+1 − α
′
i0+1) ·
φi0+1
|σi0+1|
−
n∑
i=i0+2
(α
′
i − αi) ·
φi0+1
|σi0+1|
(18)
∆ ≥ (
n∑
i=1
αi −
n∑
i=1
α
′
i) ·
φi0+1
|σi0+1|
= 0 (19)
Hence, the distribution of effort α as given in equation (10) is optimal, i.e. the
benefit is maximum if the partitions are explored greedily in decreasing order of
density.
Observation 1 If the size of all n partitions is equal, i.e. |σ1| = |σ2| = . . . =
|σn|, then
i0 ≤ α · 1|σ|
n
(20)
Lemma 1 The expected success of an attacker with the limited computational
power α < |σ| when the partition densities are uniform, i.e. φ1|σ1| =
φ2
|σ2| = . . . =
φn
|σn| is
Euniform(success) =
φ
|σ| · α (21)
Proof. By equation (8) we get,
Euniform(success) =
n∑
i=1
φi
|σi| · αi (22)
As the partition densities are uniform we have,
φ1
|σ1| =
φ2
|σ2| = . . . =
φn
|σn| = c (23)
Thus, φ1 = c · |σ1| , φ2 = c · |σ2|, . . . , φn = c · |σn|. Adding these we get,
c =
n∑
i=1
φi
n∑
i=1
|σi|
=
φ
|σ| (24)
Using equations (22), (23) and (24) we get,
Euniform(success) =
n∑
i=1
φ
|σ| · αi (25)
Euniform(success) =
φ
|σ| ·
n∑
i=1
αi (26)
Euniform(success) =
φ
|σ| · α (27)
Thus, if the partition densities are uniform then the attacker with the limited
computational resource α cannot expect to get more than φ|σ| · α passwords.
Another partition level feature that partition attacker can use is the partition
probability. The partition probabilities are given by pσ = {φ1φ , φ2φ , . . . , φnφ }. The
partition σk is said to be more popular than another partition σi if φk > φi.
Thus, exploring the partitions in decreasing order of probabilities also seems to
be a good attack strategy. But, we prove that the maximum benefit is achieved
only if the computational resource α is spent to explore the denser partitions
rather than the popular partitions.
Lemma 2 Suppose that the partition densities are non-uniform. Further, with-
out loss of generality assume that φ1|σ1| ≥
φ2
|σ2| ≥ . . . ≥
φn
|σn| . If ∃k > j such that
j∑
i=1
|σi| ≥ |σk|, then
j∑
i=1
φi ≥ φk.
Proof. Given that,
φ1
|σ1| ≥
φ2
|σ2| ≥ . . . ≥
φj
|σj | . . . ≥
φk
|σk| (28)
Therefore, we have φ1 ·|σk| ≥ φk ·|σ1| , φ2 ·|σk| ≥ φk ·|σ2| , . . . , φj ·|σk| ≥ φk ·|σj |.
Adding these we get,
|σk| ·
j∑
i=1
φi ≥ φk
j∑
i=1
|σi| (29)
j∑
i=1
φi
j∑
i=1
|σi|
≥ φk|σk| (30)
Since
j∑
i=1
|σi| ≥ |σk|, hence
j∑
i=1
φi ≥ φk
Suppose that φk ≥ φi,∀i ≤ j, i.e. the kth partition is more popular than any
of the first j partitions. Further suppose that the attacker can explore either
the first j denser partitions or the kth denser partition (which is also the most
popular partition), i.e., α =
j∑
i=1
|σi| = |σk|. Then Lemma 2 implies that explor-
ing all j partitions is more beneficial than exploring the kth partition since we
are guaranteed to have
j∑
i=1
φi ≥ φk. In other words, the benefit is maximum if
the attacker utilizes the available computational resource α to explore the denser
partitions rather than the popular partitions.
Reduction to the Fractional Knapsack Problem. The partition attacker’s
problem of distributing the limited computational resource α across n partitions
{σ1, σ2, . . . , σn} to maximize the password guessing success can be reduced to
the fractional knapsack problem [24] as shown in Table 1. Here, the computa-
tional resource α available to the attacker is analogous to the capacity W of the
knapsack. Further, every partition σi can be viewed as an object oi, with the size
|σi| of the partition σi representing the weight wi of the object oi and the number
of passwords φi representing the value vi associated with the object oi. In the
partition attack model, the goal is to recover the maximum number of passwords
n∑
i=1
αi · φi|σi| , where αi ≤ |σi|, subject to the computational constraint α ≥
n∑
i=1
αi.
Analogously in the knapsack problem, the goal is to maximize the total value
n∑
i=1
xi · viwi , where xi ≤ wi, subject to the capacity constraint W ≥
n∑
i=1
xi. The
fractional knapsack problem has a polynomial time solution which can be ob-
tained by sorting objects in decreasing order of viwi and then picking the objects
in a sequence until the knapsack is full. Similarly, the optimal attack strategy
of a partition attacker is to explore the partitions in decreasing order of density
φi
|σi| till the computational resource α is completely exhausted. Due to sorting,
the algorithm takes time O(n · logn). However, by adapting the algorithm to find
weighted medians [31], this problem can be solved in linear time O(n).
Table 1. Analogy between the Partition Attacker and the Fractional Knapsack Prob-
lem.
Category Partition Attacker Fractional Knapsack
Capacity α W
Objects {σ1, σ2, . . . , σn} {o1, o2, . . . , on}
Weights {|σ1|, |σ2|, . . . , |σn|} {w1, w2, . . . , wn}
Values {φ1, φ2, . . . , φn} {v1, v2, . . . , vn}
Constraint α ≥
n∑
i=1
αi W ≥
n∑
i=1
xi
Maximize
n∑
i=1
αi · φi|σi|
n∑
i=1
xi · viwi
3 Generality of the Attack Model
We emphasize that the space partition attack model is more general. The par-
tition attacker uses information from various sources to refine partitions and
estimate their densities. Subsequently, the attacker recovers passwords from the
target database by exploring the partitions in decreasing order of density. We
demonstrate the generality of the space partition attack model by explaining
the existing, well-known attacks using our framework. Specifically, we show that
brute-force attacks, dictionary-based attacks [7,5], grammar-based attacks [53],
probabilistic attacks [15] and attacks on random password generators [22] are
different instances of the partition attack model.
3.1 Brute-Force Attacks
The brute-force attacker possesses no information regarding the target database
and treats the entire search space as one big partition. In this case, the attacker
assumes every password to be equally likely and enumerates all possible password
combinations for guessing. This attack is guaranteed to recover every password
from the system, however, it is generally computationally infeasible to generate
and verify every possible combination against the target database. This single
partitioning instance covers the brute-force attack model.
3.2 Dictonary Attacks
Users do not choose passwords uniformly [36,29,56,20]. They often choose simple
passwords based on familiar words. The password guessing tools such as John
the Ripper (JTR) [7] and Hashcat [5] exploit this observation and use carefully
crafted dictionaries and mangling rules (learned from previous breaches) to per-
form password guessing. These so called dictionary attacks proceed as follows.
First, the entire dictionary of size N is matched against the target password
database. Then, the most popular mangling rule is applied to every dictionary
word and subsequently the resulting mangled dictionary is verified against the
target database. This process is repeated for every mangling rule. We note that
there is an implicit assumption regarding the density of the partitions. The par-
tition containing the dictionary words is assigned the highest density and is
therefore guessed first. Then the most popular mangling rule is applied on the
dictionary to generate the second dense partition and so on.
For instance, consider a dictionary W = {lion, deer, tiger, horse} of size N =
4. Let R = {W,W1,W !,W12} be the set of mangling rules with the probability
distribution P = {φ1φ = 0.4, φ2φ = 0.3, φ3φ = 0.2, φ4φ = 0.1}. JTR performs
guessing as follows. First, it verifies the entire dictionary W against the target
database, then it appends 1 to the dictionary and verifies the mangled dictionary
W1 = {lion1, deer1, tiger1, horse1}, then it guesses W ! = {lion!, deer!, tiger!
, horse!} and finally W12 = {lion12, deer12, tiger12, horse12} is verified. As all
partitions W , W1, W ! and W12 are of equal size |σi| = 4, the order of guesses
generated in the probability order φiφ is same as those generated in the density
order φiσi .
3.3 Grammar-based Attacks
In order to further speed-up the password guessing process, Weir et al. [53]
proposed an online algorithm to derive a probabilistic context free grammar from
the training dataset. The algorithm generates most effective word-mangling rules
and subsequently applies them on a dictionary in decreasing order of probability.
The authors introduced the concepts of base structure, pre-terminal structure
and terminal structure to capture the common patterns in the passwords. For
instance, S1L3D2 is the base structure, representing passwords that begins with
1 symbol followed by 3 lowercase letters and ending with 2 digits. Substituting
the values of symbol and digits in a base structure results in a pre-terminal
structure e.g., $L312 and substituting the values of alpha variable in a pre-
terminal structure with a dictionary word produces a terminal structure e.g.,
$cat12 (Table 2). Terminal-structures are the actual password guesses.
Table 2. An example of password grammar.
Structure Example
Base S1L3D2
Pre-Terminal $L312
Terminal (Guess) $cat12
Weiret al. [53] proposed and compared the effectiveness of two attack strate-
gies with the popular password guessing tool John the Ripper (JTR). The first
attack strategy generates guesses in pre-terminal probability order and the second
strategy generates guesses in terminal probability order. They simulated attacks
on 3 different real-world password lists and found that the strategy based on ter-
minal probability order was more efficient than JTR while the strategy based on
pre-terminal probability order performed similar (in some cases worse) to JTR.
They provided no explanation for this behavior, rather they were surprised by
this result. They stated the following “A surprising result to us was that when we
used pre-terminal probability order, it did not result in a noticeable improvement
over John the Rippers default rule set.”
We use our partition-based attacker framework to explain this behavior. We
show that the strategy based on pre-terminal probability order generates pre-
terminal guesses in decreasing order of probability, while the second strategy
based on terminal probability order actually generates pre-terminal guesses in
decreasing order of density. We have already proved that generating guesses in a
density order is the most efficient strategy (Theorem 1). Thus, we just need to
show that the terminal probability-based attack generates guesses in same order
as that of pre-terminal density-based attack.
Pre-terminal probability-based attack. The first attack strategy as pro-
posed by Weir et al. [53] is based on the probabilities of pre-terminal structures
in which the attacker enumerates pre-terminals in decreasing order of proba-
bility. We call this strategy as pre-terminal probability-based attack. The attack
proceeds as follows.
1. First, the attacker learns all pre-terminal structures and their probabilities
from the training set of previously disclosed passwords. Here pre-terminals
are the partitions.
2. Subsequently, the attacker finds a suitable dictionary for substituting alpha
variables in the pre-terminal structures.
3. Finally, the attacker explores all pre-terminal structures in decreasing order
of probability. More precisely, the attacker substitutes alpha variables in the
most probable pre-terminal structure with the appropriate length dictionary
words, verifies all resulting terminal structures (password guesses) against
the target database, removes this pre-terminal structure from the queue
and then repeat these guess-verify-remove process with the remaining pre-
terminal structures.
For illustration purpose, consider a toy example as shown in Figure 2. The
attacker uses previously breached databases and learns the probabilities of three
pre-terminals L6$1, L5! and $L412 to be 5/10, 3/10 and 2/10 respectively. Sub-
sequently, the attacker chooses dictionary words of length 6, 5 and 4 to replace
the alpha variables L6, L5 and L4 as shown in the figure. According to the
pre-terminal probability-based attack strategy, the attacker simply explores all
pre-terminals in decreasing order of probability. The attacker generates guesses
by substituting the alpha variable L6 in the most probable pre-terminal L6$1
with 8 dictionary words, then by substituting the alpha variable L5 in the pre-
terminal L5! with 4 dictionary words and finally by substituting the alpha vari-
able L4 in the least probable pre-terminal L412 by 2 dictionary words. Thus, as
per pre-terminal probability-based attack guesses are generated in the following
order,
1. L6$1 : {monkey$1, donkey$1, jaguar$1, rabbit$1, turtle$1, python$1,
falcon$1, parrot$1}
2. L5! : {tiger!, horse!, zebra!, sheep!}
3. L412 : {$lion12, $deer12}
Fig. 2. The pre-terminal pobability-based attack as proposed by Weir et al. [53]. The
pre-terminal L6$1 has the highest probability followed by L5! and $L412.
Terminal Probability Order. The second attack strategy as proposed by
Weir et al. [53] is based on the probabilities of terminal structures, in which the
attacker generates guesses in decreasing order of terminal probability. In this
strategy, the attacker also assigns the probability to every dictionary word. The
attacks in [53] assumed all dictionary words of the same length to be equally
likely. Thus, in our toy example, the probability of a 6 length dictionary word
is 1/8 as there are 8 such words, similarly the probability of a 5 length dictio-
nary word is 1/4 and 4 length dictionary word is 1/2. The terminal structure
is obtained by replacing alpha variables in pre-terminal structures. Thus, the
probability of a terminal is the product of probability of its pre-terminal struc-
ture and the probability assigned to a dictionary word used in the replacement
of alpha variable. If all dictionary words having the same length are equally
likely then all terminal structures (password guesses) generated using a given
pre-terminal structure have the same probability.
To see this, let φ be the number of passwords in the training set and let
φ1/φ, φ2/φ, . . . , φn/φ be the probabilities of the n pre-terminal structures. Fur-
ther suppose that |Wm| is the total number of m length words in the dictionary.
The probability of m length dictionary word as assigned by Weir et al. [53] is
thus 1/|Wm|. As the probability of all m length dictionary words is uniform
1/|Wm| and the probability of the ith pre-terminal structure is φi/φ, all termi-
nal structures (password guesses) generated by substituting the alpha variable
with a dictionary word in the ith pre-terminal structure have the same proba-
bility (φi/φ) · (1/|Wm|). The factor 1/φ is associated with every terminal struc-
ture, hence we can simply drop this term, yielding the value φi/|Wm|, which
is nothing but the density of the ith pre-terminal. In other words, the terminal
probability-based strategy basically generates password guesses in decreasing
order of pre-terminal density (Figure 3). Thus, the terminal probability-based at-
tack is essentially the pre-terminal density-based attack which Weir et al. [53]
found to be more efficient than the pre-terminal probability-based attack.
In our toy example, the order of guesses generated according to the pre-
terminal density-based attack is as follows,
1. $L412 - {$lion12, $deer12}
2. L5! - {tiger!, horse!, zebra!, sheep!}
3. L6$1 - {monkey$1, donkey$1, jaguar$1, rabbit$1, turtle$1, python$1,
falcon$1, parrot$1}
Table 3. Probability and density of pre-terminals in the toy example.
Pre-terminal Probability
φi
φ Density
φi
|Wm|
L6$1 5/10 5/8
L5! 3/10 6/8 = 3/4
$L412 2/10 8/8 = 2/2 = 1
The value of parameters used in the toy example is given in Table 3. The
guesses generated using the pre-terminal density-based attack are in the exact
reverse order of those generated using the pre-terminal probability-based attack.
3.4 Probabilistic Attacker
Consider a powerful-attacker (omniscient attacker) who has complete informa-
tion regarding the target password database and divides the search space into
unit-sized partitions (every partition has only 1 password). By Theorem 1, the
maximum benefit is achieved if these unit-sized partitions are explored in de-
creasing order of density. In this particular case, it does not matter if the guesses
are generated using partition densities dσ = {φ11 , φ21 , . . . , φn1 } or partition prob-
abilities pσ = {φ1φ , φ2φ , . . . , φnφ }, as both these strategies produce guesses in the
same order. This specific instance covers Bonneau’s attack model [15].
Fig. 3. The terminal probability-based attack as proposed by Weir et al. [53] is equiv-
alent to the pre-terminal density-based attack. The pre-terminal $L412 has the highest
density followed by L5! and  L6$1.
3.5 Sandia Attack
The offline attacks mainly exploit the fact that the human-generated passwords
have non-uniform distribution. However, due to poor implementation even the
random password generators can be flawed. In 1993, Ganesan and Davies [22]
showed that two pronounceable password generators, namely Sandia system and
NIST system, are not as secure as they claim. The Sandia system used 25 dif-
ferent pronounceable templates for generating a pronounceable password, e.g.,
cvcvcvc is one such template, where c stands for any consonant and v for any
vowel. These 25 templates were of different sizes, but for the password genera-
tion they were chosen with equal probability. Consequently, all 25 templates had
roughly the same number of passwords which lead to non-uniform template den-
sities. Thus, in the case of Sandia system every template represents one partition
and the attacker [22] can exploit the resulting non-uniform partition densities.
Similar flaw was observed in the NIST system as well.
3.6 Entropy-based Password Checker
In 2001, Yan [55] proposed an entropy-based password checker to prevent pass-
words with low entropy. The main idea of this checker was to divide pass-
word space into partitions (patterns) and then to classify passwords drawn from
smaller partitions as weak. The authors illustrated the working of their checker
by concentrating on 7 character alpha-numeric passwords. The total search space
for a 7 character password composed using lowercase letters and digits is 367. The
partitions were formed based on the number of distinct lowercase letters in the
password. The passwords composed of either digits, e.g., “1234567” or repeat-
ing a lowercase letter multiple times, e.g., “abbbb12” can be searched quickly
(∼ 107 guesses). Whereas the passwords composed of either 7 distinct lowercase
letters, e.g., “jdowsna” or 6 distinct lowercase letters and 1 digit, e.g., “is8kdab”
requires more effort (∼ (267 ) · 7! guesses). Thus, passwords created using distinct
letters belong to large partitions and are classified as strong, whereas passwords
containing either repetitive letters or digits belong to smaller partitions and are
classified as weak.
Table 4. Different instances of a partition attacker. The partitions created by proba-
bilistic attacker are the most granular (unit-sized) while those created by brute-force
attacker are least granular (only one partition).
Partition Attacker Partition Example
Brute-force entire search space
Yan pattern passwords containing 5 lowercase letters and 2 digits
Bin a L5D2
Pre-terminal L512
Hybrid Bin popular words such as abcde12 followed by bin L5D2
Probabilistic abcde12
a The bin attacker is explained in the next section.
In the following section, we present another instance of a partition attacker,
bin attacker, and show that it is much effective than the brute-force attacker.
Specifically, we divide the search space into password bins and demonstrate that
the bin densities in real-world password databases are non-uniform which results
in a huge benefit for the attacker.
4 Bin Attacker
Before defining the bin attacker, we introduce the notation which will be used
in the rest of the paper.
4.1 Notation
L - An alphabet representing the set {a, . . . , z} of lowercase letters.
U - An alphabet representing the set {A, . . . , Z} of uppercase letters.
D - An alphabet representing the set {0, . . . , 9} of decimal digits.
S - An alphabet representing the set of 33 special symbols such as @,#,$,&,*
and so on.
+ - denotes 1 or more occurrences of the alphabet.
∗ - denotes 0 or more occurrences of the alphabet.
? - denotes 0 or 1 occurrence of the alphabet.
{i, j} - denotes at least i and at most j occurrences of the alphabet, where
0 ≤ i ≤ j.
|λ| - represents the number of elements in a set λ.
4.2 Bins
LL UL DL SL
LU UU DU SU
LD UD DD SD
LS US DS SS
L  = Lowercase letters {a … z}, |L| = 26 
U = Uppercase letters {A … Z}, |U| = 26 
D  = Decimal numbers {0 … 9}, |D| = 10 
S  = Special symbols , |S| = 33
a7
d4
f2
……..
LD
“LD”  Bin capacity  is 26 X 10 = 260 unique words
Fig. 4. Illustration of a bin space. The number of l = 2 length bins derived using the
alphabet set σ = {L,U,D, S} is 4l = 42 = 16.
Consider an alphabet set γ = {L,U,D, S} composed of 4 character classes.
We refer to the l length strings derived from γ as password bins or bins, e.g., L8,
U1L7, S1U1L5D1 are 8 length bins. Every bin represents a class of passwords,
e.g., the bin L8 represents 8 length passwords composed entirely of lowercase
letters while the bin U1L7 represents 8 length passwords that begin with an up-
percase letter followed by 7 lowercase letters. Thus, the password search space
is divided into total 4l bins. We define the bin capacity as the number of pass-
words represented by the bin (Figure 4). For instance, the capacity of the bin
L8, composed of all lowercase letters is |L8| = 268. By summing the capacities
of all bins we obtain,
4l∑
k=1
Ck = (|L|+ |U |+ |D|+ |S|)l
= |γ|l (31)
where Ck is the capacity of k
th bin. Note that the number of bins increases
exponentially with the increase in password length l. Let the maximum password
length be lmax. Therefore, the size of the search space σ is,
|σ| =
lmax∑
l=1
|γ|l
=
|γ|lmax+1 − |γ|
|γ| − 1
|σ| ≈ |γ|lmax (32)
Definition 4. The bin attacker is an instance of a partition attacker which (1)
divides the password search space σ into bins and (2) explores these bins in
decreasing order of density (by Theorem 1).
We show that the bin attacker performs much better than the brute-force at-
tacker by exploring only the denser bins (Theorem 1) and completely ignoring
the unutilized bins. In the next sections, we discuss the training and test datasets
and then demonstrate the effectiveness of the bin attacker.
4.3 Training and Test Data
Table 5. Total number of passwords and utilized bins in publicly available breached
databases.
No Category Database Total Passwords Utilized Bins Year
1 Gaming Rockyou 32,603,388 140,401 2009
2 Gaming Gamigo 6,919,630 40,365 2012
3 Social LinkedIn 5,586,887 102,066 2012
4 Mail Gmail 4,929,090 23,348 2014
5 Mail Mail.ru 4,664,479 83,061 2014
6 Mail Yandex 1,261,810 26,428 2014
7 Media Gawker 1,085,085 5,539 2010
8 Misc Yahoo 442,834 15,711 2012
9 Software Phpbb 255,421 7,905 2009
We collected 9 publicly available breached password databases [3,8]. We were
particularly interested in studying the passwords of compromised websites with
a large user base. Table 5 shows the number of passwords along with the category
of breached websites and the year of breach. The table also depicts the number
of bins that were used in each of the databases for creating passwords, e.g.,
32.6 million passwords in the Rockyou database were derived from just 140,401
bins. These bins were not used uniformly and as depicted in Figure 5 more than
80% of the passwords in all breached databases were shorter (l ≤ 10). Further,
none of these websites had any password composition requirements during the
time of breach. The breach of these databases also revealed the insecure storage
practices followed by the websites. For instance, all Rockyou passwords were
stored in plaintext while longer Gawker passwords were truncated to 8 characters
before hashing. None of the password databases studied in this paper had their
passwords salted. They were either stored in plaintext or were at most hashed.
In the following section, we demonstrate how the bin attacker can guess a
large proportion of passwords in each of the breached databases. We use the
Rockyou database to estimate the bin densities and then measure the resistance
of the remaining 8 password databases against the bin attacker.
Fig. 5. Length-wise cumulative distribution of passwords in breached databases. More
than 90% passwords have length at most 12 (l ≤ 12).
4.4 Efficiency of the Bin Attacker
Consider a system with 32 million registered users, φ = 225. Suppose that the
maximum password length lmax is 10 and thus by equation (32) the attack search
space is |σ| ≈ 9510 = 265.7. Today, a dedicated password cracking hardware can
generate up to 350 billion (238.35) guesses per second [1], we assume that the
bin attacker can use such machine for 2.5 days (217.72 seconds) and generate
α = 238.35 ·217.72 ≈ 256 guesses. If the bin densities are uniform then by Lemma 1
the expected success of this bin attacker is,
Euniform(success) =
φ
|σ| · α =
225
265.7
· 256 = 215.3 ≈ 40, 000 (33)
Thus, in case of uniform bin densities the attacker can compromise only 0.13% of
the password database (40,000 user accounts). However, the analysis of 32million
(a) Success rate of attacker A using bin densities learned from Rockyou.
(b) Success rate of attacker B using bin probabilities learned from Rockyou.
Fig. 6. Comparing the success rate of attacker A exploring denser bins with the success
rate of attacker B exploring popular bins.
Rockyou passwords reveals that the bin densities are highly non-uniform and
with α = 256 guesses, the bin attacker can recover nearly 94.34% of the Rock-
you database (30.76 million passwords). Now, we measure the resistance of the
remaining 8 password databases against the bin attacker who learns the bin den-
sities from the Rockyou database. The guessing efficiency of such bin attacker is
depicted in Figure 6a and one can see that with α = 256 guesses, the bin attacker
can crack nearly 90% passwords in every breached database. This implies that
the bin densities derived from the Rockyou database closely approximates the
bin densities of the remaining 8 password databases. Further analysis of breached
Table 6. Percentage % of passwords in the top dense bins of breached databases. These
bins are smaller with length l ≤ 8.
Database L{1,8} D{1,8} LxD8−x
Rockyou 26.80 12.19 17.88
Gamigo 6.28 3.13 8.74
Linkedin 10.26 2.71 15.39
Gmail 27.80 11.72 17.61
Mail.ru 17.32 17.58 9.86
Yandex 11.84 40.03 6.56
Gawker 42.33 5.22 25.32
Yahoo 24.44 5.14 20.78
Phpbb 41.47 11.00 14.41
databases reveals that smaller bins (l ≤ 8) of the form D+, L+ and L+D+ are
much denser (Table 6). For instance, there are nearly 26.80% (8.74 million)
Rockyou users in L{1,8} bins, 12.19% (3.97 million) users in D{1,8} bins and
17.88% (5.83 million) users in LxD8−x bins, where 1 ≤ x ≤ 7. Similar behavior
is observed in the other breached databases as well. The theoretical password
space is huge (95l, for 95 printable ASCII characters and password length l) but
the utilized search space is very small. As a result, even with the small comput-
ing power α = 240, the bin attacker (Figure 6a) can break nearly 60% passwords
in the breached databases3.
4.5 Dense Bins vs Popular Bins
In Lemma 2 we proved that the attacker benefits if the partitions are explored in
decreasing order of density rather than in decreasing order of probability. Figure
6 shows the success rate of both these attack strategies for bin partitions. The
attacker A explores bins in decreasing order of density (Figure 6a) while the
attacker B explores bins in decreasing order of probability (Figure 6b). One can
observe that even with the small computing power (α ≤ 240) the attacker A can
gain huge success by exploring the denser bins. However, the expected success
of the attacker B who explores the most probable bins is insignificant. This is
because the most probable bins are not necessarily the denser ones. For instance,
the bin L8 with 2.46 million passwords is the third most popular bin and the
bin D6 with 2.28 million passwords is the fourth most popular bin in the Rock-
you database. However, the density of L8 bin is
2.46 million
268 ≈ 0.00001183 while
3 We did not get the count of passwords that belong to LinkedIn and Gamigo databases
and consequently the success of the bin attacker with α = 240 guesses is less than
60% for both these databases.
that of D6 bin is
2.28 million
106 ≈ 2.28. The attacker with the computing power say
α = 235 targeting the popular bins will exhaust all its resources without com-
pletely exploring the popular L8 bin (26
8 ≈ 238 capacity) and recovering less
than 2.46 million passwords. On the other hand the attacker targeting denser
bins can recover 2.28 million passwords from D6 bin and use the remaining
235 − 220 ≈ 235 computational power to explore the next denser bins. There-
fore, the attacker exploring denser bins breaks more passwords by spending its
resources wisely.
Remark 1 : In the absence of password composition policies, the resulting bin
densities become highly non-uniform. As a result, the effort of the bin attacker is
reduced drastically as a substantial fraction of the target password database can
be recovered by exploring only the denser bins.
4.6 Composition Policy
The composition rules forbid the use of bins composed of only one alphabet
and enforce the use of bins composed of at least 2 or 3 alphabets. In this case,
the search space is too large (at least 26 · 26 · 95l−2 > 95l−1) to carry out the
brute-force search. However, merely increasing the search space does not imply
that all the available bins are used uniformly. Surveys [48,18] and the analysis
of breached databases suggest that bins of the form {S,D}pU1Ln−2p−1{S,D}p,
where p > 0, that begin and end with digits or symbols and containing an
uppercase letter followed by lowercase letters are more popular. To gain a better
idea, we analysed the passwords composed of at least two alphabets from the
breached databases. Analysis of these passwords provide more insights into bins
that becomes highly dense as a result of enforcing different composition rules.
Table 7. Identifying potential denser bins used in password creation when different
alphabet sets are enforced upon users. The data (in percentage%) indicates the popu-
larity of denser bins for the given alphabet set. ‘-’ indicates the absence of corresponding
alphabet set in the breached database.
Set Dense Bins Rockyou Gamigo LinkedIn Gmail Mail.ru Yandex Gawker Yahoo
{U,L} U1L+ 71.43 31.19 49.67 - 24.53 62.70 67.76 57.17
{U,D} U+D+ 82.61 57.94 61.85 - 43.85 46.17 81.14 72.10
{L,D} L+D+ 83.46 30.03 63.92 73.68 46.07 54.72 58.36 75.63
{U,L,D} U1L+D+ 62.66 23.45 41.66 - 28.30 39.91 42.92 45.01
{U, S} U∗S1U∗ 69.07 43.63 52.65 - 62.50 67.15 70.98 57.14
{L, S} L∗S1L∗ 76.39 76.51 73.36 76.63 83.30 85.39 85.96 67.31
{U,L, S} U[0,1]L∗S1U[0,1]L∗ 49.25 61.62 44.87 53.66 - 53.35 0.00 36.09
{D,S} D∗S1D∗ 45.43 27.00 49.75 59.46 53.63 50.93 48.77 40.00
{U,D, S} U∗S1U∗D+ 42.07 39.87 39.50 - 41.79 33.97 55.76 34.08
{L,D, S} L∗S1L∗D+ 43.13 46.57 39.49 42.02 55.44 47.26 43.80 34.39
{U,L,D, S}U1L+D∗S1D∗ 30.85 38.36 39.60 - 30.94 31.26 35.81 25.56
It is evident from Table 7 that enforcing composition rules can still result in
the non-uniform bin densities. For instance, the analysis of passwords derived
using the alphabet set {U,L,D} revealed that most of these passwords (62.66%
in Rockyou) are created using bins of the form U1L+D+ that begin with an
uppercase letter followed by lowercase letters and end with digits. If the bin
U1L6D2 becomes denser, then even the attacker with α = 2
40 can explore it
completely as the bin size is 267 · 102 < 240. Thus, division of the search space
into bins can be very useful to crack the complex passwords which emerge due
to composition policies.
Remark 2 : The passwords created in the presence of composition rules can
still result in the non-uniform bin densities. For instance, if users are enforced
to create alpha-numeric passwords, the analysis of breached databases suggests
that the bins of the form U1L+D+ could become more dense. This observation
can be easily exploited by the bin attacker thus defeating the purpose of the en-
forced composition rule.
5 Countermeasure
In section 2, we proved that the partition attackers gains maximum benefit if
the partitions are explored in decreasing order of density. Now, we show that
partition attackers can be countered only if the partition densities are made
uniform. Before deriving the exact formula for the minimum expected success of
a partition attacker, we prove few lemmas.
Lemma 3 Let 0 ≤ f ≤ 1 and
φ1
|σ1| ≥
φ2
|σ2| ≥ . . . ≥
φn
|σn| (34)
then for 1 ≤ j < n,
j∑
i=1
φi + f · φj+1
j∑
i=1
|σi|+ f · |σj+1|
≥
j+1∑
i=1
φi
j+1∑
i=1
|σi|
(35)
Proof.
(
j∑
i=1
φi + f · φj+1) · (
j+1∑
i=1
|σi|)− (
j+1∑
i=1
φi) · (
j∑
i=1
|σi|+ f · |σj+1|) (36)
=
j∑
i=1
φi ·
j∑
i=1
|σi|+ |σj+1| ·
j∑
i=1
φi + f · φj+1 ·
j+1∑
i=1
|σi|
−
j∑
i=1
φi ·
j∑
i=1
|σi| − φj+1 ·
j∑
i=1
|σi| − f · |σj+1| ·
j+1∑
i=1
φi
(37)
= |σj+1| ·
j∑
i=1
φi − f · |σj+1| ·
j∑
i=1
φi − f · |σj+1| · φj+1
−φj+1 ·
j∑
i=1
|σi|+ f · φj+1 ·
j∑
i=1
|σi|+ f · |σj+1| · φj+1
(38)
= (|σj+1| ·
j∑
i=1
φi) · (1− f)− (φj+1 ·
j∑
i=1
|σi|) · (1− f) (39)
= (
j∑
i=1
|σj+1| · φi −
j∑
i=1
φj+1 · |σi|) · (1− f) (40)
= (1− f) ·
j∑
i=1
(|σj+1| · φi − φj+1 · |σi|) ≥ 0 (41)
since φi|σi| ≥
φj+1
|σj+1| for 1 ≤ i ≤ j. Therefore,
j∑
i=1
φi + f · φj+1
j∑
i=1
|σi|+ f · |σj+1|
≥
j+1∑
i=1
φi
j+1∑
i=1
|σi|
(42)
Corollary 1 For 1 ≤ j ≤ n− 1,
j∑
i=1
φi
j∑
i=1
|σi|
≥
j+1∑
i=1
φi
j+1∑
i=1
|σi|
(43)
Proof. The proof follows immediately by putting f = 0 in Lemma 3.
Corollary 2 For 1 ≤ j ≤ n,
j∑
i=1
φi
j∑
i=1
|σi|
≥ φ|σ| (44)
where φ =
n∑
i=1
φi and |σ| =
n∑
i=1
|σi|.
Proof. The proof follows immediately from Corollary 1.
Theorem 2 The expected success of an attacker with limited computational
power α < |σ| is minimum if the partition densities are uniform, i.e. φ1|σ1| =
φ2
|σ2| = . . . =
φn
|σn| .
Proof. By Lemma 1, if the partition densities are uniform then the expected
success of the attacker with computational power α < |σ| is,
Euniform(success) =
φ
|σ| · α (45)
Now, consider the case of non-uniform partition densities. Without loss of gen-
erality assume that,
φ
′
1
|σ1| ≥
φ
′
2
|σ2| ≥ . . . ≥
φ
′
n
|σn| (46)
where
n∑
i=1
φ
′
i = φ.
By Theorem 1, the maximum success for the attacker with computational power
α < |σ| is,
Emax(success) =
i0∑
i=1
φ
′
i + (α−
i0∑
i=1
|σi|) ·
φ
′
i0+1
|σi0+1|
(47)
where i0 is such that
i0∑
i=1
|σi| ≤ α <
i0+1∑
i=1
|σi|.
Let f =
(α−
i0∑
i=1
|σi|)
|σi0+1| . Note that 0 ≤ f ≤ 1.
Emax(success) =
i0∑
i=1
φ
′
i + f · φ
′
i0+1 (48)
Using Lemma 3 we get,
Emax(success) ≥
i0+1∑
i=1
φ
′
i
i0+1∑
i=1
σi
· (
i0∑
i=1
σi + f · σi0+1) (49)
since
i0∑
i=1
σi + f · σi0+1 = α we have,
Emax(success) ≥
i0+1∑
i=1
φ
′
i
i0+1∑
i=1
σi
· α (50)
By Corollary 2, we know that
i0+1∑
i=1
φ
′
i
i0+1∑
i=1
≥ φ|σ|
Emax(success) ≥ φ|σ| · α = Euniform(success) (51)
This result is more general and can be used to counter different instances of
a partition attacker. However, we concern ourselves with the bin partitioning
instance and in the light of Theorem 2, we propose a bin explorer system to
counter the bin attacker.
6 Bin Explorer System
As demonstrated earlier, the bin attacker exploits the prevalence of non-uniform
bin densities in the real-world password data and targets the denser bins to
recover a major fraction of the password database. By Theorem 2, the success
of the bin attacker can be minimized by making all bins equally dense. Now,
we use this result to propose a new scheme to counter the bin attacker. For this
purpose, consider the generation of a system assigned random password. It can
be viewed as a sequence of following 3 steps.
1. Select the length l, e.g., l = 10.
2. Randomly select the l length bin β from the collection of n bins, e.g., β =
L4D2L2S2.
3. Randomly select a word in the bin β, e.g., kebz93ga-?
In such scheme, users have no control over the creation of their own passwords
and the resulting passwords are also difficult to remember [33,46]. To counter
the bin attacker, we need to ensure only the uniform bin densities which can
be achieved even if the system decides upon the first two steps of the random
password creation process. Thus, the system can randomly assign the l length
bin β to the user and allow the user to select a password from this assigned bin
β. Therefore, we can mitigate the threat of the bin attacker and still provide the
users with some control over their password creation. We refer to such system
as bin explorer.
From equation (45) we observe that, as the number of users φ in the system
increases, the expected success Euniform(success) of the attacker also increases.
Therefore, just spreading users across different bins is not enough. The system
should also ensure that the expected success Euniform(success) of the attacker
is bounded. This can be achieved by increasing the search space size |σ|.
6.1 Determining the Minimum Password Length
Again consider the settings where the maximum password length lmax is 10,
the attack search space is |σ| ≈ 265.7, the computing power of bin attacker
is α = 256 but the number of users φ = 230. Assuming uniform password
bin densities, by equation (45), the bin attacker can now compromise at least
Euniform(success) = 2
20.3 ≈ 1.3 million user accounts. Earlier the attack on a
system with φ = 225 users could recover only 40,000 passwords (equation (33))
but now the same attack when mounted on a system with φ = 230 users looks
more dangerous. The expected success Euniform(success) of the bin attacker is
directly proportional to the number of users φ in the system. More the number
of users in the system, more the expected success of the bin attacker. Thus, the
size of the search space |σ| should also depend upon the number of users φ in
the system. Rearranging the terms in the equation (45) we get,
|σ| = φ · α
Euniform(success)
(52)
Using (32) we get,
|γ|l = φ · α
Euniform(success)
(53)
where, γ is the alphabet set from which the password is derived and l is the
password length. Using this relation, one can precisely compute the minimum
password length lmin as,
lmin =
log(φ) + log(α)− log(Euniform(Success))
log(|γ|) (54)
Now, we can use this result to decide the minimum password length and thus re-
strict the bin attacker with the computational power α to system-desired success
Euniform(success).
Fig. 7. Determining minimum password length lmin for different values of φ and alpha-
bet set γ. The parameters depicting attackers guessing capability α = 256 and expected
success Euniform(success) = 2
10 are fixed.
Figure 7 depicts the minimum password length lmin required to bound the
expected success Euniform(success) = 2
10 of the bin attacker with the computa-
tional resource α = 256. The password length is determined for different systems
which vary in both the number of users and the alphabet sets used for the bin
generation. For instance, if the number of users φ = 225 = 32 million and the
alphabet size |γ| = |L|+ |U |+ |D|+ |S| = 95, then the minimum password length
should be 11. The number of available bins in this case is n ≈ 411 and the den-
sity of every bin is φ|σ| = 2
25/9511 = 225/272.27 ≈ 2−47.3. Hence, because of the
uniform bin densities, the effort of the offline attacker is increased exponentially.
6.2 User-Bin Assignments
To protect against offline attacks, websites enforce password composition policy
on users. However, the enforced policy is same for all users of a given website
which can again result in a fewer denser bins and a large number of empty bins.
To prevent the underutilization of a search space, the system should play an ac-
tive role in distributing users across different bins. A few distribution strategies
are as follows (comparison in Table 8).
Round Robin. In this strategy, the system assigns a bin to a new user in
a round-robin fashion. For this purpose, the system maintains an array of n bins
along with an index b < n which points to the next available bin in the array.
After the arrival of a new user, the next available bin βb is allocated and the
value of the index is increased to (b + 1) mod n. However, as a result of this
strategy, bins of various sizes have the same number of passwords φn which leads
to non-uniform bin densities. Further, assigning bins in a fixed order opens up an
attack wherein the attacker who gets access to the system and can infer the order
in which users created accounts now knows the structure of a particular user’s
password. The attacker can therefore mount targeted attacks on a particular
user account, e.g., admin. The space required for maintaining the data-structure
is proportional to the total number of bins n and the time required to allocate
a bin is O(1).
Density-ordered. In this allocation strategy, the system strives to make every
bin equally dense by assigning the least dense bin to a new user. To achieve
this, the system stores all bins in a list in decreasing order of density. When a
new user arrives, the system selects the least dense bin βmin from the end of
this sorted list. If there are multiple least dense bins, the system chooses a bin
uniformly at random, thereby increasing the effort of targeted attacks, e.g., if
the density of all bins composed of 6 lowercase letters and 2 digits is equal, then
the system chooses one of these
(
8
2
)
bins uniformly at random. Now, in order to
succeed the targeted attack requires searching all
(
8
2
)
bins.
As the list is already sorted, one can use binary search technique to iden-
tify a region within the list containing bins with least density. Subsequently,
the system randomly picks a bin βmin from this region and allocates it to the
user. Finally, the density of the allocated bin βmin is updated and its position
in the list is rectified using the binary search algorithm. The space required for
maintaining the sorted list is proportional to the total number of bins n while
the time require to allocate the least dense bin is O(logn).
Random. In this strategy, the system randomly generates a bin for every user.
The probability of assigning the bin should be proportional to its size. Otherwise
the bins of different capacities will have the same number of passwords, disturb-
ing the density uniformity. Thus, the expected number of passwords in any bin
i is φi = φ · |σi||σ| . Therefore, the expected density of a bin is φ|σ| . Since the bins
are assigned randomly some bins can get φ|σ| · x − φ|σ| (where x ≥ 1) more users
than the expected. We call the quantity x as stretch. For the random assignment
strategy the stretch x is not more than lognloglogn with high probability [23]. Since
logn = log(4lmin) = 2 · lmin, x = 2·lminlog(2·lmin) . In this strategy, there is no need to
keep the track of number of users in each bins. Also no pointers are required.
The bins are generated randomly upon the arrival of the new user and therefore,
the required space and time is just O(1). Further, random bin assignment makes
targeted attacks on a particular user arduous. Therefore, the random approach
is better among all proposed approaches.
Power of Two Choices. In this strategy, the system randomly chooses two
bins and assigns the least dense bin to the new user. Again the probability of
choosing any bin should be proportional to its size. Otherwise the bins of different
capacities will have same number of passwords, disturbing the density unifor-
mity. Such implementation would require the storage to remember the number
of users in every bin σi. Therefore, O(n) space is required. The expected density
of a bin is φ|σ| . However, the stretch in this strategy depend upon the size of a
bin [12]. In case of smaller bins [12] the stretch is 2 · loglogn = 2 · log(2 · lmin)
and for the larger bins [12] the stretch is 4 + ε with high probability. In case of
database compromise, the attacker can learn the exact number of users in any
given bin.
Table 8. Comparison of different bin distribution strategies.
Strategy Space Time Expected
density
Stretch x
Round Robin O(n) O(1) φ
n·|σi|
φ
n·|σi| −
φ
|σ|
Density-ordered O(n) O(logn) φ|σ| 1 + ε
Random O(1) O(1) φ|σ|
2·lmin
log(2·lmin)
Power of Two
Choices
O(n) O(1) φ|σ| 2 · log(2 · lmin)
for smaller bins
and 4 + ε for
larger bins
6.3 User-Bin Adaptation
Various techniques have been proposed in the past to help users create secure and
memorable passwords [54,26,21,17]. Now, we show how these existing schemes
can be easily adapted for helping users in creating passwords from the system
assigned bin.
Non-Iterative Scheme. This scheme directly asks users to create a password
according to a system assigned bin in one step.
1. System chooses a random bin β of length l ≥ lmin from the collection of
predefined bins, e.g., β = U1S1L1D2S1U1L2
2. User creates a password according to the system assigned bin, e.g.,
“D@c45&Mac”.
To help users, one can also modify the system proposed in [26] to create mnemonic
passphrases corresponding to the system assigned bin, e.g., for bin
β = U1S1L1D2S1U1L2 the mnemonic passphrase can be “It’s 12 noon I am
hungry” and therefore the password is “I’s12&Iah”.
Iterative Scheme. In 2009, Forget et al. [21] showed that the security of the
text passwords can be improved either by inserting random characters in the
user chosen password or by randomly replacing the characters in the user cho-
sen password. While, Bonneau et al. [17] proposed an incremental approach to
imprint 56-bit secret into human memory. Both these methods can be combined
to help users to choose a secret from the assigned bin. The scheme is as follows,
1. User chooses a lowercase password of length l ≥ lmin subject to a blacklist
of say top 10,000 popular passwords.
2. System chooses a random bin β of length lmin from the collection of prede-
fined bins.
3. System calculates the hamming distance hd between the user chosen bin
Llmin and system assigned bin β.
4. After every x successful logins, the system attempts to minimize the ham-
ming distance hd by 1. User should replace the lowercase letter in the pass-
word by a letter corresponding to the bin β.
5. After hd · x number of successful logins, the password from bin Llmin is
transformed to system assigned random bin β.
The system proposed in [17] requires the assigned 56-bit secret to be stored in
plaintext until user learns it. But in our scheme, the password is stored securely
at every stage. The system only has to store the assigned bin in plaintext until
the password is created as per this assigned bin. Once the final password is set,
this bin information is also removed from the system.
Password Manager. Password manager is one of the convenient ways for se-
curely managing passwords. It generates, stores and recalls passwords on behalf
of the users. Password managers such as [44,41] generate passwords based upon
the password policy. However, password managers generate such passwords inde-
pendently in isolation without communicating with the server. Such strategies
can lead to maximum load of logn/loglogn on few bins with high probabil-
ity [23]. Uniform bin densities can be ensured if password managers generate
passwords using the system assigned bin. The password manager’s logic can be
easily tweaked to create passwords according to the assigned bins.
Recent studies [35,49] revealed serious vulnerabilities in the implementation
of different password managers. We believe that security conscious users can
still use password managers to store the partial information instead of storing
the entire password of critical accounts. This partial information can be used to
recall the entire password whenever required. For instance, in the bin explorer
schemes one can use password managers to store the password bin information
as a hint and use it to recall their actual password during login.
There are also studies which indicate that the presence of strength meters
can result in stronger passwords [19,45]. We can use this strategy in influencing
user behavior towards rarer bins. When users choose any of the denser bins the
strength meter can warn them about the risks of offline attacks.
7 Experiments
We studied the usability of both non-iterative and iterative schemes described
in the previous section with 33 users. Both these studies were conducted with
the same 33 users in a laboratory in the presence of an experimenter. All users
were graduate working professionals and regular internet users. 10 users (30.3%)
were female and 23 users (69.7%) were male belonging to the same nationality.
We studied the usability of a non-iterative scheme followed by that of a it-
erative scheme. In both studies, we used a set of 10 length bins composed of
exactly 6 lowercase letters and remaining 4 letters were derived using any 3 al-
phabets U,D, S e.g., LLDLDLUULL, LLLSLULDDL and so on. The number
of 10 length bins composed of exactly 6 L and any 3 alphabets U,D, S in the re-
maining 4 positions is
(
10
4
) ·34 = 17010. These bins were allocated using random
distribution strategy and therefore each user is assigned a unique bin with a very
high probability (nearly 0.97). We asked users to use the assigned 10 length bin
to create a minimum 10 length password. The first 10 letters of the password
had to follow the assigned bin pattern and the remaining letters of the password
had no restriction. Now, we describe our experiments in detail.
7.1 Non-Iterative Scheme
The non-iterative experiment was conducted in two phases. We refer to the first
phase as Password Creation phase and the second phase as Password Recall
phase.
1. Password Creation phase. In this phase, users were asked to create a
minimum 10 length password using the system assigned bin displayed on
the password creation page (Figure 8). After retyping password, users were
directed to the login page, where they had to enter their password again.
2. Password Recall phase. After 72 hours, we invited users for the recall
phase. There were no practice sessions between these two stages. This setup
Fig. 8. Creating password using system assigned bin LSLLSDLLLS in the non-
iterative experiment.
helped us to measure the recall of the password, when password has not
been used for a while. If users were not able to recall their password within
at most 5 attempts, we showed them their bin which was used during the
password creation. After displaying the bin, 3 more attempts were allowed.
If the users were not able to recall their password even after displaying the
bin, we showed them their password. Finally, we asked users to fill a short
survey. The questions mostly captured the user sentiment and password
storage behavior. These questions and responses are listed in [9].
Now, we investigate the memorability and efficiency of the non-iterative scheme.
Memorability. We measure memorability in terms of:
1. Number of users who successfully recalled their passwords during the pass-
word recall phase.
2. Average number of login attempts required for the successful recall.
For convenience, we classify users into 3 categories, namely password storage,
bin storage and no storage. 3 users (9.10%) who reported writing down their
password belong to the password storage category, 4 users (12.12%) reported
writing down their bin belong to the bin storage category and remaining 26
users (78.78%) belong to the no storage category. All users who wrote down
their password and 3 users who wrote down their bin recalled their password
successfully. 26 users who did not report storing their passwords or bins were
further split into two categories, namely no hint and bin hint. 11 users from the no
storage category who successfully recalled their passwords without requiring any
hint belong to the no hint category. The remaining 15 users failed in the password
recall and we helped them by displaying their corresponding bin which was used
during the password creation. These 15 users belong to the bin hint category.
Upon viewing the bin, 10 more users succeeded in recalling their passwords.
Thus, overall 21 users from the no storage category recalled their passwords and
5 users forgot their password. The results are summarized in Table 9.
The average number of login attempts required to successfully login during
the recall phase is also shown in Table 9. The users who successfully recalled
their passwords during the recall phase with or without bin hint are referred
to as successful users. Users who wrote down their bins required 1.33 login at-
tempts while users in no hint category required 1.72 attempts on an average.
Table 9. Data of users who successfully recalled their passwords in non-iterative study.
Category Total
Users
Successful
Recalls
Average
Login
Attempts
Average
Login
Time
Password Storage 3 3 (100%) 1.00 21.22s
Bin Storage 4 3 (75%) 1.33 35.52s
No Storage-No Hint 11 11 (100%) 1.72 37.94s
No Storage-Bin Hint 15 10 (66.67%) 3.73 77.20s
The users in the bin hint category made 2.53 attempts on an average before
clicking on Forgot Password button. After viewing their bin, users required 1.20
more attempts to succeed. Therefore, average login attempts of users in bin hint
category is much higher (3.73 attempts).
Efficiency. We measure efficiency in terms of:
1. Average password creation time required during the creation phase
2. Average login time required during the recall phase.
Password creation required nearly 139 seconds on an average. The average lo-
gin time required for the successful recall of password during the recall phase is
shown in Table 9. The time required for recalling passwords in password storage,
bin storage and no hint category is less compared to the time required for recall-
ing passwords in bin hint category. This is because the average login attempts
required for the successful bin hint category users is much higher (3.73 attempts).
User Sentiment. The memorability and efficiency results of the non-iterative
experiment indicate that passwords created using randomly assigned bins are
both difficult to remember and to enter. This can also be observed from the
Table 10. User sentiment in non-iterative experiment.
Likert Scale Creating
password
was easy?
Remembering
password
was diffi-
cult?
Created
password
was more
secure?
StronglyAgree 0 (0%) 11 (33.33%) 11 (33.33%)
Agree 11 (33.33%) 14 (42.42%) 14 (42.42%)
Neutral 8 (24.24%) 5 (15.15%) 4 (12.12%)
Disagree 8 (24.24%) 2 (6.06 %) 3 (9.09%))
StronglyDisagree6 (18.18%) 1 (3.03%) 1 (3.03%)
survey responses that we received from the users (Table 10). Since random bins
require users to place digits, symbols and uppercase letters at 4 random positions,
the resulting passwords are difficult to remember and to enter. However, most
users (75.75%) felt that resulting passwords are more secure than the passwords
that they usually create.
7.2 Iterative Scheme
To help users in remembering digits, symbols and uppercase letters at random
positions, we designed an iterative experiment. We performed this experiment
with the same 33 users in 2 phases.
Day 0
Day 1
Day 2
Day 3
Day 4
Fig. 9. Evolution of a simple password “testpassword” to a complex password
“7eS+pas$word” using system assigned bin “DLUSLLLSLL”. On Day1, system sug-
gests replacement of letter ‘t’ in highlighted red box with any digit D. This process
continues for next 3 days until first 10 letters of “testpassword” are aligned with 10
length bin “DLUSLLLSLL”.
1. Password Creation phase. This phase was split into 5 stages and required
5 days for completion. The stages were numbered from 0 to 4. In the 0th
stage, users were asked to create a minimum 10 length lowercase password
(L10). Further, the system generated a random 10 length bin for every user
and stored it in the password database. This bin is not displayed to the user.
In the next 4 stages, system guided users in transforming the first 10 letters
of their password from L10 bin to the system assigned bin. To complete
the ith stage users were asked to login using the password created in the
(i − 1)th stage. Upon successful login, the system minimizes the hamming
distance between the current bin and system assigned bin by suggesting a
letter replacement in the current password with an appropriate alphabet
from the set {U,L,D, S}. The user can choose any letter from the suggested
alphabet and replace the letter of a current password as suggested by the
system. Thus, after completing the 4th stage, the final password of user
differed from the password created in 0th stage in 4 random positions and
was according to the assigned bin (Figure 9).
2. Password Recall phase. The password recall phase in the iterative exper-
iment is same as defined in the non-iterative experiment.
Now, we investigate the usability of the iterative scheme.
Memorability. Since users successfully recalled their passwords during differ-
ent iterations of creation phase, we report the memorability results of only recall
phase. In the iterative study, we classify users into 2 categories, password stor-
age and no storage. We do not have bin storage category since no one reported
writing their bin. The reason is that the bin was never displayed to the users
directly during the password creation. 5 users (15.16%) who reported writing
their password belong to the password storage category and the remaining 28
users (84.84%) belong to the no storage category. All users who wrote their
passwords, successfully logged into the system. Moreover, 26 users in no storage
category successfully recalled their password without any hint (no hint). Thus,
the iterative system resulted in huge improvement compared to the previous
non-iterative system. We helped 2 unsuccessful users in their password recall by
showing them their corresponding bin which was used in the password creation.
Upon viewing the bin, 1 more user succeeded in recalling the password. Thus,
overall 27 users from no storage category recalled their passwords and only 1
user forgot the password.
Table 11. Data of users who successfully recalled their passwords in iterative study.
Category Total
Users
Successful
Recalls
Average
Login
Attempts
Average
Login
Time
Password Storage 5 5 (100%) 1 25.19s
No Storage-No Hint 26 26 (100%) 1.65 35.05s
No Storage-Bin Hint 2 1 (50%) 3 59.21s
The average login attempts required for successful login during the recall
phase is shown in Table 11. Users who wrote down their passwords or bins re-
called their passwords in just 1 attempt. Users in no hint category required just
1.65 login attempts on an average during the recall phase. Since users in the
bin hint category were shown bin after few login attempts (at most 5), therefore
their average login attempt is higher (3).
Efficiency. Password creation required nearly 182.3 seconds on an average. This
creation time includes the time required for creating a lowercase password in the
0th iteration and the time to replace a letter with an appropriate alphabet in the
subsequent 4 iterations. The average login time required for the successful recall
of password during the recall phase is shown in Table 11. The amount of time
required for recalling passwords in the password storage and no hint category is
less compared to the amount of time required for recalling passwords in the bin
hint category.
User Sentiment. The memorability and efficiency results of the iterative study
indicates that the passwords created using randomly assigned bin can be remem-
bered. The survey responses also indicate that creating password using iterative
method is much easier compared to non-iterative method (Table 12).
7.3 Non-Iterative vs Iterative Scheme
We highlight the prominent differences in the usability results of iterative and
non-iterative schemes.
Table 12. User sentiment in iterative experiment.
Likert Scale Creating
password
was easy?
Remembering
password
was diffi-
cult?
Created
password
was more
secure?
StronglyAgree 7 (21.21%) 4 (12.12%) 10 (30.30%)
Agree 13 (39.39%) 13 (39.39%) 18 (54.54%)
Neutral 9 (27.27%) 10 (30.30%) 4 (12.12%)
Disagree 3 (9.09%) 6 (18.18%) 1 (3.03%)
StronglyDisagree1 (3.03%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%)
1. Creation time. The average password creation time in the iterative scheme
(182.3s) is more compared to the non-iterative scheme (139s) because of the
stage-wise transformation of the password.
2. Recall and Login attempts. In the iterative scheme, 31 users (93.93%)
recalled their passwords successfully while in non-iterative scheme only 17
users (51.51%) succeeded in their password recall. Moreover, the average
login attempts for 31 successful users in the iterative scheme is just 1.54
while the average login attempts for 17 successful users in the non-iterative
scheme is 1.89. This indicates that the users in the iterative scheme can recall
their passwords more reliably without requiring any hint.
3. User sentiment. Only 4 users (12.12%) found it difficult to create the pass-
word using the iterative scheme. On the other hand, 14 users (42.42%) found
it difficult to create the password using the non-iterative scheme. Thus, pass-
words in the iterative scheme are easy to create as well as easy to remember.
Moreover, 28 users (84.84%) in the iterative scheme and 25 (75.75%) users
in the non-iterative scheme felt that the resulting passwords are secure. Re-
sponses are listed in [9].
All 33 participants in our study were working professionals and may have
better memory than average, which could positively influence the usability re-
sults. We only had 33 participants and with a larger population we might be able
to observe further patterns. However, the purpose of this study was to observe
whether the iterative or non-iterative scheme is usable for creating passwords
from system assigned bins. As the usability data indicates, the iterative scheme
fared better than the non-iterative in many aspects.
8 Related Work
User behavior and Attacks. A great deal of research effort has been spent
in describing the password creation strategies of users and finding the best tech-
niques to break these passwords in an offline mode. In 1978, Morris and Thomp-
son [36] analysed 3289 user passwords and found that 86% of these are weak
either due to their prevalence in the dictionary or due to their short length. Fur-
ther these passwords contained only lowercase letters or digits. Later in 1990,
Klein [29] successfully broke 25% of the passwords on the Unix system using
the brute-force attack. In 1999, Moshe and William [56] based upon their survey
of 997 participants found that 80% of the passwords were derived using only
lowercase and uppercase letters. Then in 2005, Narayanan and Shmatikov [37]
demonstrated the effectiveness of Markov models by generating the candidate
passwords in decreasing order of the probability and cracking 67.6% of the
passwords. In 2007, Floreˆncio and Herley [20] studied the passwords of nearly
5 million users and found that most of these passwords are composed using ei-
ther lowercase letters or digits. In 2009, Weir et al. [53] proposed generating most
probable guesses by learning probabilistic context-free grammar (PCFG) from
the breached databases. In our work, we proved that the density-based guesses
are more effective than the probability-based guesses. We demonstrated that the
bin attacker gains maximum benefit if the bins are explored in decreasing order
of density rather than in decreasing order of probability.
Mostly the password research is conducted by analysing the passwords in
the publicly available breached databases [53,28,34] or by analysing the pass-
words collected using the surveys [48,30,47]. Bonneau however, for the first time
performed the large scale study of anonymized 70 million passwords of Yahoo
database in [15]. Bonneau also derived a useful measure for gauging the strength
of a password database. However, computing this measure requires knowledge
about the probability distribution of passwords. We relaxed this constraint and
proposed a more general attack model which exploits the available information
to divide the search space into partitions and explores them in decreasing order
of density.
The presence of composition rules is believed to create secure passwords [51]
while [40,30,47] suggest that longer passwords also provide equivalent security.
However, all these results are based upon the survey of not more than a few
thousand users and there is no real data available to study the passwords created
in the presence of composition rules. We argue that the presence of composition
policies can also be exploited by the attacker if the partition densities remain
non-uniform.
Countermeasures. To counter offline attacks, a significant amount of effort has
been, and is being, invested to help users in remembering a high entropy secret.
Various schemes have been proposed to influence the password creation strategies
of users which includes the use of mnemonic-based passwords [54,26], system
modified passwords [21], system assigned passwords [46], long passwords [47] and
pronounceable passwords [32]. A recent study [17] shows that users can remember
a randomly assigned 56-bit secret using the technique of spaced repetition while
another recent study [14] helps user in generating a user friendly password which
is difficult for machine to crack. These studies emphasize the need and importance
of high entropy passwords specifically to counter the offline attacker.
Motivated by these research, we proposed iterative scheme to help users in
recalling their password from the system assigned bin. We purposefully adapted
the system modified password scheme proposed by Forget et al. [21] and the
spaced-repetition technique proposed by Bonneau et al. [17] to make our iterative
scheme more usable. Moreover, our adapted iterative scheme addresses usability
concerns associated with the Forget et al. scheme [21] and security concerns of
Bonneau et al. scheme [17].
– In 2008, Forget et al. [21] showed that users accept few system suggested
modifications to their password. The authors tested 4 conditions, namely,
Insert-2, Insert-3, Insert-4 and Replace-2 with 16 participants in each con-
dition. Also, all modifications were suggested to the user at once (non-
iterative). Consequently, Insert-4 scheme which proposes 4 insertions to the
user-chosen password were found to be unusable, even though the recall
phase was conducted immediately after answering two questions and per-
forming a distraction task of 45 sec. In our work, we tested Replace-4 con-
dition in both iterative and non-iterative fashion with 33 participants and
showed that users are more likely to accept system suggested replacements
when the approach is incremental. Further, we conducted the recall-phase
after a delay of 72 hours from the password creation phase. Also, note that
Replace-4 condition is new and has never been tested before.
– The spaced repetition approach proposed by Bonneau et al. [17] requires the
system-assigned password to be stored either in plaintext or in encrypted
form until the user memorizes it. But in our iterative scheme, the password
is stored securely using a hash function at every stage. The system only has
to store the assigned bin in encrypted form until the password is created as
per this assigned bin. Once the final password is set, this bin information
is also removed from the system. If the server is compromised, the attacker
has access to both the encryption key and the database. In this scenario, the
spaced repetition scheme of Bonneau et al. [17] reveals the entire password
while our scheme reveals only the bin information.
9 Discussion
9.1 Hybrid Bin Attacker
The main advantage of the bin attacker is that it does not require any dic-
tionary to operate. The attacker takes advantage of the fact that users create
passwords predominantly using lowercase letters or digits and if there are any
uppercase letters and symbols in the passwords then they are at the predictable
positions. Recently, researchers showed that human-generated passwords follow
Zipf’s law [52]. The observation is that few passwords are very frequent and
constitute a good fraction of the password database. For instance, the analysis
of Rockyou database [25] reveals that 5000 most popular passwords were used
by almost 20% of the users (6.4 million users) while recently released password
frequency list of a live Yahoo database [11] suggests that 5000 most popular
passwords are used by almost 10% of the users (7 million users) . But there is
also a long list of infrequent passwords (count ≤ 5) which constitutes a major
fraction of the password database. For instance, 53% (16.98 million) of the pass-
words in Rockyou database and 56% (38.59 million) of the passwords in Yahoo
database have a frequency count of less than five. These infrequent passwords
constitute the heavy tail of the distribution and it is difficult to estimate their
probabilities.
Based upon these observations, we provide another instance of a partition
attacker which we refer to as hybrid bin attacker. This attacker creates unit-
sized partitions for every popular password found in the breached databases.
The density of the unit-sized partition containing a single password is equal to
the password frequency count. For illustration purpose, assume that the hybrid
bin attacker uses Rockyou dataset for the training purpose. The most popular
password in the Rockyou database is “123456” with 290,729 occurrences. The
attacker constructs a unit-sized partition for this password and sets its density
to 290,729. Table 13 shows that the password “123456” is the popular choice in
the remaining databases as well which demonstrates the advantage of creating
unit-sized partitions with popular passwords.
Table 13. Top 5 most popular passwords of 6 datasets.
Rank Rockyou Gmail Mail.ru Yandex Yahoo Gawker Phpbb
1 123456 123456 qwerty 123456 123456 123456 123456
2 12345 password 123456 123456789 password password password
3 123456789 123456789 qwertyuiop 111111 welcome 12345678 phpbb
4 password 12345 qwe123 qwerty ninja lifehack qwerty
5 iloveyou qwerty qweqwe 1234567890 abc123 qwerty 12345
Top 5(%) 1.70% 1.71% 5.56% 6.07% 0.78% 0.68% 2.18%
After creating unit-sized partitions, the hybrid bin attacker creates bin parti-
tions and estimates their densities from the available password data. By Theorem 1,
the attacker then sorts the resulting partitions in decreasing order of density and
attacks the target database. In this way, the hybrid bin attacker can first tar-
get the popular passwords by creating a unit-sized partitions and then target
the infrequent passwords by creating bin partitions. By using top 5000 Rock-
you passwords which constitutes nearly 20% (6.4 million) user accounts of the
Rockyou database, the attacker can recover a substantial fraction of passwords
in other databases (Table 14). A simple way to counter this hybrid bin attacker
is to employ the counting scheme as proposed by Schechter et al. [43] which
bans the password after it reaches a predefined frequency threshold. With this
countermeasure in place, there are no popular passwords to exploit and the effi-
ciency of the hybrid bin attacker is reduced to that of the bin attacker. However,
this countermeasure requires abandonment of password-specific salts, as it is not
possible to count the occurrences of a password if every password has a unique
salt.
Table 14. Percentage of passwords cracked in different databases by using top 5000
frequent password of the Rockyou database.
Gmail Mail.ru Yandex Yahoo Gawker Phpbb
530,387(10.76%) 417,669(8.95%) 175,354(13.90%) 47,495(10.72%) 75,871(7.00%) 36,713(14.37%)
9.2 Salting and Slow Hashes
It is possible to slow down the offline attacker by using password-specific salts
and employing iterative algorithms such as PBKDF2 [27]. Now, we discuss the
effect of such techniques on the efficiency of both the bin attacker and the hybrid
bin attacker.
Salting. The use of password-specific long random salts serves two purposes [42],
makes it infeasible to use a rainbow table [39] and makes it more time-consuming
to crack a large list of passwords.
1. The use of salts prevents pre-computation attacks such as rainbow tables. If
passwords are just hashed then the attacker can pre-compute hashes for com-
monly used millions of passwords well-in advance before acquiring the pass-
word database. After stealing the password database, the password hashes
can be reversed immediately into plaintext by performing lookups in the
rainbow table. Performing lookup is considerably faster than computing the
hash function which speeds up the cracking process substantially. On the
other hand, if the password database is salted, then the rainbow table would
have to contain “guess||salt” pre-hashed. The value of salt is not known to
the attacker until the password database is stolen. In this case, the attacker
can pre-compute rainbow table for every value of the salt. However, every
bit of salt doubles the storage requirement and if the salt is sufficiently long
(128 bits) then this pre-computation is infeasible. As the goal of the salt is to
prevent pre-generated databases from being created, it is stored in plaintext.
Hence, once the salted password database is compromised, the attacker can
learn the salt and start the password cracking process. The use of long ran-
dom salts forces the attacker to crack the hashes after acquiring the password
database, instead of being able to just look them all up in a rainbow table.
This is how our attacker is modelled, we do not assume that a partition
attacker pre-computes the hashes in the rainbow table.
2. The use of password-specific salts also conceals the frequency distribution
of passwords. If multiple users have same passwords then applying the hash
function results in same hashes. The offline attacker can simply count the
frequency of each password hash in the database and then use the comput-
ing power to crack only unique hashes. If each password has a unique salt
then hashes will be different even for the same password. Because of the
password-specific salt the attacker cannot simply use the counting technique
to find out if two passwords in the database are same or not. The attacker
has to compare a guess against each password entry. If there are φ entries
in the salted password database, verifying a single guess in this scenario re-
quires O(φ) comparisons. Thus, the use of long random salts slows down
the attacker by a factor of φ, where φ is the number of users in the sys-
tem. Previously, if an attacker could verify 2G guesses against the password
database, after using the long random salts, the number of guesses is reduced
to 2G/2log(φ) = 2G−log(φ).
In section 3, we showed that the bin attacker with the computing power of
256 can break more than 90% of passwords in 6 different password databases
(Figure 6a). As most of the test datasets have over a million entries φ ≈ 220
and assuming that these passwords were salted with long random hashes, the
bin attacker with the computing power of 256 can now verify 2G−log(φ) =
256−20 = 236 guesses. As shown in Figure 6a, the bin attacker with 236
guesses can still compromise nearly 50% of the passwords in the most target
password databases which is a significant proportion. Thus, with the use of
random salts, the number of guesses that the bin attacker can generate have
reduced, but the bin attacker can still compromise significant portion of the
password database.
3. Further, the use of password-specific salts refrains the use of count-min
sketch-based countermeasure proposed by Schechter et al [43]. As a result,
few passwords become very popular which results in Zipf’s law. As explained
earlier, the hybrid bin attacker can compromise a substantial portion of the
password database using just a few thousand popular guesses. Although,
the use of password-specific salts conceals the frequency distribution of pass-
words and slows down the offline attacker, it does not prevent the Zipf ’s
law in human-generated passwords which can be exploited by the hybrid bin
attacker.
4. The purpose of salting is only to slow down the offline attacker who possesses
the password database. It does not protect against the online attacker who
mounts the online guessing attacks on a remote website. The online attacker
exploits the fact that human-generated passwords are highly biased and as
a result some passwords are extremely popular. For instance, the count of
most popular password in Yahoo database [11] is 753,217 (1%). Thus, online
attacker can compromise nearly 1% of the total accounts by merely trying a
single guess on a website and use of salt in this attack does not matter.
5. Further, salting does not slow down the offline attacker who is only after one
or few accounts. It helps only if the attacker wants to break many passwords
from the password database containing large number of entries. The attacker
who wants to compromise only one important account can generate all 256
guesses as for this particular attack φ = 1. For instance, if the attacker is
after, say, admin’s account or the account of an influential person such as
a celebrity then the attacker can learn the value of the salt and compute
hash(guess||salt) for all 256 guesses. Thus, the use of a salt does not slow
down the targeted attack. The impact of salt is high only if the number of
users φ is large and the objective of the offline attacker is to break as many
passwords as possible.
6. Recently, researchers [13] emphasized the importance of releasing password
frequency list of a website for deciding the various policy parameters. To en-
able this, they presented a differential privacy based mechanism for releasing
the perturbed password frequency lists with rigorous security, efficiency, and
distortion guarantees. Now, the knowledge of password frequency distribu-
tion can help organizations in setting various policy parameters, for instance
the number of unsuccessful attempts k before the account is locked. A smaller
value of k can decrease the usability of the authentication experience, while
selecting a larger value of k can reduce security. The empirical data from
password frequency list could help organizations to make a more informed
decision when considering the trade-off between security and usability. Since
salting conceals the frequency distribution of passwords, this proposed mech-
anism [13] requires abandonment of password-specific salts.
Slow Hashes. Conventional hash functions such as MD5, SHA1, SHA2 can be
computed quickly by employing custom made GPU clusters. To make the task
of guessing a single password harder (costlier), one can use iterative algorithms
such as PBKDF2 [27]. By choosing appropriate number of iterations, PBKDF2
can limit the number of guesses to 40,000 guesses per second [2]. If passwords are
hashed with unique salts, it further slows down the offline attacker. However,
if Zipf’s law is prevalent in the password data then the hybrid bin attacker
requires just a few thousand guesses to recover a substantial fraction of the target
database (Table 14). On the other hand, if passwords are not salted (to prevent
the Zipf’s law phenomena) then the bin attacker can compute 236.59 guesses
using a machine capable of generating 40,000 guesses per second for a month.
With 236.59 guesses, the attacker can still compromise nearly 50% passwords in
the target password database of size φ = 220 (Figure 6a) which is a significant
proportion. The use of PBKDF2 has certainly slowed down the bin attacker but
it did not make the attacker completely ineffective.
9.3 Long Passwords
Recent research [30,47] suggests that longer passwords are more usable and se-
cure. However, if longer passwords are composed mainly of shorter popular pass-
words, the password strength will be reduced. For instance if the longer password
has “123456” or “password” as a substring then its strength is reduced. We used
the top 1000 lowercase passwords and analysed longer lowercase Ll passwords,
where l >= 12, in every breached database. The results in Table 15 clearly in-
dicate the presence of popular substrings in the longer passwords which can be
exploited by the offline attacker.
Table 15. Percentage of Ll passwords(l >= 12) containing popular substrings.
Database Longer passwords Percentage
Rockyou 690,823 44.75
Gmail 73,551 34.05
Mail.ru 74,516 35.21
Yandex 16,967 27.65
Yahoo 6,546 34.03
Phpbb 2,340 44.48
9.4 Bins Utilization
Dividing the search space into bins enables us to gauge the utilized search space
and therefore determine the effort required for the bin attacker to break the
password database in the event of a breach. If the densities of password bins are
highly skewed then even an attacker with a small computing power can recover
a major fraction of the password database. Most websites attempt to counter
offline attacks by forcing users to create passwords from a larger search space,
accepting only those passwords derived using a large alphabet set and satisfying
minimum length requirement. However, users can respond to this requirement
by choosing passwords from bins that requires least effort to recall which again
results in few denser bins and can be easily exploited by the bin attacker. Fig-
ure 10 depicts the huge gap between the available number of bins and actually
utilized bins as a function of password length l. The number of available bin in-
creases exponentially with the password length l, however the number of utilized
bins increases only linearly. As a result the search space is underutilized which
can be exploited by the bin attacker.
Fig. 10. Number of available bins vs number of utilized bins as a function of password
length l.
Enforcing the same composition policy and length requirement on all users
can again lead to the small number of denser bins. Therefore, the system should
guide users in the password creation process and we believe that using bin ex-
plorer schemes is a step ahead in that direction. Earlier (in Table 5) we saw that
the number of bins used in the Rockyou database was 140,401. Thus, the capa-
bility of users in remembering passwords from different bins should not be un-
dermined. If 32 million Rockyou users would have used even 100, 000 < 140, 401
bins uniformly, the attacker would have required huge effort. The uniform density
makes the task of offline attacker exponentially difficult due to the large number
of bins as well their huge average size, both exponential in terms of password
length.
10 Conclusion
The existing probabilistic measures such as entropy and partial guessing metric
which are used to measure the offline guessing resistance of password databases
are based upon stronger assumptions. These measures require the knowledge of
password probabilities which are not always easy to learn. For instance, it is
difficult to estimate the probabilities of infrequent passwords in a heavy-tailed
distribution. The partition attack model proposed in this paper does not assume
the knowledge of password probabilities. The partition attacker uses information
from previous breaches and, divides the search space into partitions and learns
the partition densities. The partitioning approach enables us to measure the
utilized search space more effectively thereby providing a more accurate estimate
of the password guessing effort in the event of a database breach.
The partition attack model is more general as different partitioning strategies
represents different instances of a partition attacker. On one extreme, there is
an all-powerful attacker, equipped with the knowledge of password probabilities,
who divides the search space into unit sized partitions and explores them in de-
creasing order of density. On the other extreme there is a brute-force attacker
who has zero knowledge and treats the entire search space as a single parti-
tion. The bin attacker, pre-terminal density attacker and hybrid bin attacker
lie somewhere in the middle of attack spectrum since these attacks are more
efficient than brute-force attacks but less efficient than probabilistic attacks.
The bin densities in the real-world password databases are highly skewed and
even a weak attacker can cause sufficient damage to the system. The pre-terminal
partitions are more granular than bins and therefore, the pre-terminal density
attacker is more efficient than the bin attacker. The hybrid bin attacker on the
other hand create more granular partitions than pre-terminal density attacker
and is therefore more effective than pre-terminal partitioning.
The partition attacker can be thwarted by ensuring that all partitions are
equally dense. We proposed a bin explorer system which first determines the
minimum password length by considering the number of users in the system
and then uses the random bin distribution strategy to achieve the uniform bin
densities, thereby making the task of the bin attacker exponentially difficult.
Since the passwords are created using the system assigned bins, the resulting
password distribution does not obey Zipf’s law and consequently the hybrid bin
attacker and pre-terminal density attacker are also countered.
The usability study results suggest that passwords created using the system
assigned bins are not difficult to remember. We found that users can benefit by
storing the assigned bins and employing them as hint later during the password
recall. Further, users also preferred random bins for protecting their critical ac-
counts.
Future Work. In this paper, we demonstrated that the partition attacker gets a
huge benefit by exploring denser partitions. However, this greedy attacker is un-
observant since it does not learn any information while exploring the partitions.
It would be interesting to model a dynamic attacker that learns information
during the attack and employs it to target the remaining passwords. Also, en-
couraged by the usability results of the iterative scheme, we intend to explore
more schemes to help users in choosing passwords from the system assigned bins.
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